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NO MATTER HOW SMALL… PROPERTY, AUTONOMY, AND STATE IN HORTON HEARS A WHO!

Dr. Seuss’s Horton Hears a Who!1 has long been viewed as a parable of human
equality and dignity. Published in 1954, the same year as the U.S. Supreme Court’s
landmark anti-discrimination decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 2 Horton’s
famous refrain, “A person’s a person, no matter how small,” elegantly reflects the
egalitarian principles espoused by the American civil rights movement. Theodor
Seuss Geisel, the creator and alter ego of Dr. Seuss, had long opposed racial
discrimination in the United States3 and wrote Horton, according to biographer
Donald Pease,4 to “atone” for the xenophobic character of his World War II political
cartoons.5 Horton the elephant has since become a popular symbol of tolerance,
equality, and human dignity.6 Even more importantly, Horton’s young readers have,
for generations, taken from this lovable elephant a greater empathy for those who
may be different than themselves.
But unlike later Seuss classics that convey similar messages of racial tolerance
(e.g., Green Eggs and Ham7 and The Sneetches8), beneath its characteristically childlike
facade, Horton raises a cascade of complex issues that challenge conventional notions

1.

Dr. Seuss, Horton Hears a Who! (1954). Horton was adapted as a half-hour animated television
special in 1970, which was produced by Theodor Seuss Geisel. Geisel was not involved in the subsequent
2008 feature-length animated film distributed by 20th Century Fox.

2.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

3.

Donald E. Pease, Theodor SEUSS Geisel 65–66 (2010).

4.

Professor Pease has also contributed an essay to this Law Review issue. See Donald E. Pease, Dr. Seuss’s
(Un)Civil Imaginaries, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 509 (2013–2014).

5.

Pease, supra note 3, at 92–93.

6.

There is a large body of literature that invokes Horton as a touchstone for such qualities. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Todres & Sarah Higinbotham, A Person’s a Person: Children’s Rights in Children’s Literature, 45
Colum. Hum. Rts L. Rev. 1 (2013) (discussing children’s rights); Tanya Jeffcoat, From There to Here,
from Here to There, Diversity Is Everywhere, in Dr. Seuss and Philosophy: Oh, the Thinks You Can
Think! 93, 99–100 (Jacob M. Held ed., 2011) (explaining notions of societal diversity); Dean A.
Kowalski, Horton Hears You, Too! Seuss and Kant on Respecting Persons, in Dr. Seuss and Philosophy:
Oh, the Thinks You Can Think!, supra, at 126 (describing Horton as a Kantian moral actor); Angela
D. West, Horton the Elephant Is a Criminal: Using Dr. Seuss to Teach Social Process, Conflict, and Labeling
Theory, 16 J. Crim. Just. Educ. 340, 345 (2005) (noting Horton’s widespread perception as a “cautionary
tale against racial prejudice and discrimination”); Peter M. Cicchino, Defending Humanity, 9 Am. U. J.
Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 1, 2 (2001) (noting that Horton ref lects “the unique, the profound, the
unavoidable moral and political consequences that f low from the recognition that the other whose
presence we share is a person”).

7.

Dr. Seuss, Green Eggs and Ham (1960) (imparting the lesson that color does not matter when it
comes to ham and eggs); see also Pease, supra note 3, at 124 (discussing how Green Eggs evidences “the
deep social bond concealed beneath socially entrenched antagonisms”).

8.

Dr. Seuss, The Sneetches, in The Sneetches and Other Stories (1961) (showing the disastrous
consequences of racial discrimination to Sneetch society, which is sharply divided between those who bear
stars on their bellies and those who do not); see also Pease, supra note 3, at 120 (“The Sneetches remain
trapped in a destructive social order until they arrive at a shared recognition: their need for a social order
grounded in exclusionary oppositions victimizes both the Sneetches with and the Sneetches without stars.”).
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of property, autonomy, and state action.9 In this essay, I explore the property-based
undercurrents that run throughout Horton, from Horton the elephant’s initial claim to
the speck on which Who-ville resides, to the struggle for possession between Horton
and the jungle “state” ruled by the kangaroo, to the unsettling conclusion in which
Who-ville is taken under the state’s protective arm. These undercurrents offer insight
into the mid-twentieth-century American society in which Geisel lived and wrote, a
society in which attitudes toward private property, capitalism, and government still
basked in the rosy afterglow of Allied victory in World War II.
Finding Property in Horton

It is axiomatic under the common law that a finder of lost property is entitled to
keep it, and that he thereby obtains good title as against everyone in the world save for
the original owner.10 This point is illustrated in the frequently taught eighteenthcentury case Armory v. Delamerie,11 in which the Court of the King’s Bench permits a
poor chimneysweep to recover the value of a found jewel from the most famous
silversmith in England. How did this rule arise? Through the application of the even
more ancient notion that possession of a thing gives the possessor certain rights in that
thing: rights that are superior to the rights of those who do not possess it.12 Hence, in
the canonical case Pierson v. Post,13 the person who leaps out of the brush and kills a fox
becomes the owner of the carcass, notwithstanding the fact that a pack of hunters and
hounds spent the greater part of the morning driving the fox into the killer’s hands.
Possession, and in the case of Pierson, ultimate possession, is the key to ownership.
So, too, does Horton the elephant make his claim to a wayward speck of dust. To
paraphrase the narrative, Horton, while bathing in the jungle, hears a faint cry
emerge from a passing speck of dust. He hears it only by virtue of his large and
sensitive elephantine ears. The speck, of course, turns out to be the home of a tiny
civilization, Who-ville, which is populated by a diverse array of humanoid creatures
called Whos. From all outward appearances, Horton is motivated to take possession
of the speck through a combination of curiosity and altruism. He responds to the
barely audible yelp, which appears to be a cry for help, as the speck floats precariously
close to the pond in which Horton is bathing. To ensure its safety, Horton secures
the speck atop a clover flower and then delights in becoming acquainted with the
9.

Horton is not the only Dr. Seuss story that raises issues of property and ownership. See, e.g., Aaron J.
Skoble, Thidwick the Big-Hearted Bearer of Property Rights, in Dr. Seuss and Philosophy: Oh, the
Thinks You Can Think!, supra note 6, at 159.

10.

See generally R.H. Helmholz, Wrong ful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and Case Law, 80 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1221 (1986).

11.

(1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.).

12.

See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 74 (1985) (“For the
common law, possession or ‘occupancy’ is the origin of property.”).

13.

3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 217
(Little, Brown, & Co. 1881) (discussing Pierson and related cases concerning possession).
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tiny residents of Who-ville. But within a few pages of this felicitous encounter, a
subtle transformation begins to color Horton’s relationship with Who-ville.
Horton as Possessor

Soon after Horton comes into possession of the speck on which Who-ville is
situated, he begins to refer to the speck, the clover, and the Whos as his own.
“What terrible splashing!” the elephant frowned.

“I can’t let my very small persons get drowned!”14

Horton refers to the Whos as “my” persons. He does so with seemingly altruistic,
protective intentions, but colored by a sense of possession and hence of ownership.
This possessory linguistic formulation occurs not just once, but multiple times,
especially as others attempt to wrest possession of the speck away from Horton.15
Thus, when the sour kangaroo and her joey16 jump into the pool creating a splash
and endangering the Whos, Horton hustles his clover and speck away.
In Horton’s view, the kangaroo is not simply endangering other inhabitants of
the forest; she is endangering something that Horton owns. As one scholar has
theorized, the ownership of property contributes to one’s conception of self and sense
of personhood.17 Horton, very soon after encountering the Whos, seems to assimilate
their identity into his own, to feel that they and the dust speck on which they reside
constitute an integral part of him. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. presages this sentiment
in The Common Law, writing, “Possession is to be protected because a man by taking
possession of an object has brought it within the sphere of his will. He has extended
his personality into or over that object.”18 Such is certainly the case with respect to
Horton and his speck of dust.
But let us consider in slightly more detail what, precisely, Horton owns when he
takes possession of that wayward speck of dust. According to the ancient maxim
cuius est solum, ejus est usque ad caelum et ad inferos (the rights of the surface landowner
extend upward to the heavens and downward to the center of the earth),19 the owner
14.

Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 1 (emphasis added).

15.

As Richard Chused, Professor of Law at New York Law School, pointed out to me in a dinner conversation
preceding the symposium on February 28, 2013, the first person possessive “my” is also commonly used to
express kinship (e.g., my mother, my children) and group association (“let my people go”). Despite the fact
that Horton the elephant shares no kinship or group identity with the Whos, he may, in fact, use the
possessive “my” as a reflection of his feelings of (parental) kinship toward the Whos. But even if such were
the case, notwithstanding Horton’s gross biological misunderstanding, this justification would not in any
event apply to the speck or the clover, to which Horton also refers as his own.

16.

A “ joey” is a baby kangaroo.

17.

Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 959 (1982) (“Most people possess
certain objects they feel are almost part of themselves. These objects are closely bound up with
personhood because they are part of the way we constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in
the world.”).

18.

Holmes, supra note 13, at 207 (basing his reasoning on the work of Kant and Hegel).

19.

Black’s Law Dictionary 341 (5th ed. 1979); see also, Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. 1929).
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of a parcel of land owns everything above and below it. This notion originated in
Roman law and has been handed down today in only slightly modified form.20 It is
for this reason that a landowner can claim title to the minerals that lie below the
surface, to the waterfowl that fly above it, and to the trees that grow upon it. 21 And
not only to the trees, but to their trunks, their branches, every pinecone and leaf,
every insect that crawls upon each leaf, and every atom of every such insect. All are
owned by the owner of the land.22
So, too, it would go with Who-ville. Horton takes possession of the speck and all
that resides upon it no matter how improbably small: its buildings, its streets, its
outlandish instruments and vehicles. But what about its inhabitants?
Owning Whos?

The disturbing notion of persons23 as property is not a new one, finding its roots
in laws as ancient as writing itself. Every ancient civilization enslaved persons against
their will: enemies captured in battle, convicted criminals, and the populations of
vanquished territories.24 In feudal Europe, landowners held nearly absolute dominion
over the serfs populating their lands, requiring them to work the fields and perform
other labor under conditions that were akin to enslavement.25 In Russia, this system

20. See Holmes, supra note 13, at 209 (discussing Roman law antecedents to common law property rules

regarding possession).

21.

See John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 979 (2008).

22.

This principle is known as the doctrine of “accession,” in which “the granting of title to some resource is
based on its relationship to something that is already owned.” Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent
Infringement Remedies, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 175, 195 (2011). For this reason, every landowner has an
exclusive common law right to kill or capture game on his or her own land, subject to state regulation. See,
e.g., McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127 (1922); Hanson v. Fergus Falls Nat’l Bank, 65 N.W.2d 857 (Minn.
1954); see also State v. Taylor, 214 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. 1948) (stating that in private waters subject to state
regulation, the owner of the soil beneath the waters retains the exclusive right to fish, hunt, or trap
animals). “For Blackstone, there were two forms of occupancy entitling the occupant to acquisition of
property; firstly, and with particular reference to game, the occupier of land would have title to animals on
his land by virtue of the land (ratione soli) or by virtue of some privileged position or grant from a superior
granting body (ratione privilegi); secondly, there was the occupancy of a first finder.” Peter Cook, The
“Prerogative Property” Basis of the English Game Law System, in Property and Protection: Legal
Rights and Restrictions 124–25 (Brian W. Harvey et al. eds., 2000) (emphasis added).

23.

Although the characters in Horton are not human, per se, they are anthropomorphized to such a degree
that their characters are clearly more akin to humans than animals. I will thus treat them, for purposes
of this essay, as human. The distinction is important, as animals have always been viewed as chattels
under the common law and, for the most part, still are, whereas humans have not been viewed as
property in the United States since the abolition of slavery in the nineteenth century.

24.

See, e.g., Niall McKeown, Greek and Roman Slavery, in The Routledge History of Slavery 19 (Gad
Heuman & Trevor Burnard eds., 2011).

25.

See John G. Sprankling, Understanding Property Law § 15.04[A] (3rd ed. 2012) (“In the early
feudal era, the lands of the nobility and gentry were cultivated by landless serfs under customary
arrangements that differed little from slavery.”).
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persisted into the early twentieth century.26 And even in the United States, through
the middle of the twentieth century owners of “company towns” exerted significant
control over the lives of their worker-inhabitants and their families, even to the
extent of depriving them of basic rights. 27 In all of these cases, dominion over
property gave rise to significant rights over, if not outright ownership of, persons.
But control of human property did not arise solely in connection with the
acquisition of territory. Sometimes it came with possession of things, such as vessels.
Consider the case of La Amistad, the infamous Spanish slave ship whose imprisoned
passengers mutinied off the coast of Cuba in 1839.28 After seizing control of the vessel,
the mutineers demanded that they be returned to Sierra Leone, their homeland. But
the two Spanish officers who survived deceived the mutineers and piloted La Amistad
north, eventually making landfall on Long Island. There, while reprovisioning, the
mutineers were apprehended by the crew of a U.S. naval vessel, the Washington. The
Africans were taken into custody and tried. The ensuing legal proceedings were long
and complex, involving both charges of mutiny and an action by the Spaniards to
reclaim their lost human “cargo.”29 In addition, the crew of the Washington argued
that La Amistad and the slaves should be treated under the international law of salvage
and thereby awarded to the Americans. That is, under salvage law, recovery of an
abandoned ship entitles the finder to its entire contents. While most shipwreck and
salvage cases involved claims over gold bullion and silver plate, the most valuable
contents of La Amistad were fifty-three living persons. Had the crew’s salvage claim
been successful,30 ownership of those persons would have followed ownership of the
vessel, to which the American crew of the Washington laid claim.
Consider in this light the microscopic passengers on Horton’s speck of dust, which
he describes as “my very small persons.” Does the elephant’s possessory intuition
regarding the Whos flow from his hard-won possession of the speck that they inhabit?
26. See Gregory L. Freeze, Reform and Counter Reform 1855–1890, in Russia: A History 199 (Gregory L.

Freeze ed., 2009).

27.

See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (concluding that by the late twentieth century, an owner of
a camp for migrant workers was not entitled to prevent visits by health care workers).

28. The slaves, captured somewhere in western Africa, had recently been transported to Cuba aboard a

Portuguese vessel. They were then being transported on La Amistad from Havana to the port of Guanaja
in central Cuba, where they would be sold to owners of the booming sugar plantations there. Markus
Rediker, The Amistad Rebellion: An Atlantic Odyssey of Slavery and Freedom 1–2 (2012);
see also Roger S. Clark, Steven Spielberg’s Amistad and Other Things I Have Thought About in the Past
Forty Years: International (Criminal) Law, Conflict of Laws, Insurance and Slavery, 30 Rutgers L.J. 371,
383–400 (1999).

29. The African mutineers, represented in the Supreme Court by then-Congressman, and former President,

John Quincy Adams, were ultimately exonerated. The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Story,
held that the Africans had been kidnapped in violation of Spanish treaty obligations and were therefore
not slaves. United States v. Libellants & Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518 (1841); see also
Rediker, supra note 28, at 190.

30. See Howard Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad: The Saga of a Slave Revolt and its Impact on

American Abolition, Law, and Diplomacy 101–02 (1987) (describing details of the salvage claims);
Clark, supra note 28, at 386 n.43 (noting that the salvage claim for the Africans failed, as they were held
to no longer be slaves, but succeeded as to the ship and its other cargo).
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Dispossession and Repossession

Theft, of course, is a risk faced by all owners of property; and both the common
law and our own sensibilities favor an owner’s recovery of wrongfully taken property.
It is for this reason that Horton (and we) feel aggrieved when the Wickersham
Brothers31 seize the speck-bearing clover from Horton’s trunk, and even more so
when the black-bottomed eagle Vlad Vlad-i-koff carries it away.32 Here, the reader,
or the young listener, becomes complicit in Horton’s ownership claim. Horton is no
longer the subjugator of a once-autonomous people, but a victim of simple property
theft. And again, the language of ownership, and dispossession, is manifest in the
text: “They snatched Horton’s clover! They carried it off ” and Horton’s ensuing plea
to Vlad-i-koff, “Please don’t harm all my little folks . . . .”33
It is at this point in the narrative that the great transformation in Horton occurs.
Vlad-i-koff drops the clover bearing Who-ville into a vast field of clover one hundred
miles wide. He doesn’t destroy it, he doesn’t drown it or burn it, he simply makes it
hard to find. And Horton vows to get it back.
“I’ll find it!” cried Horton, “I’ll find it or bust!

I SHALL find my friends on my small speck of dust!”34

Why, the reader asks, does Horton pick through three million clovers until he
finds the one bearing “his” speck of dust? Is Horton simply lonely, wishing to be
reunited with his small friends? If so, he does not express this sentiment. Is Horton
motivated by a sense of altruism and concern for the well-being of the Whos? If so,
then surely he could have left them safely among the clover, where they would have
remained hidden from unfriendly monkeys, eagles, kangaroos, and whatever other
jungle denizens wished them ill.
But Horton doesn’t let them be. He doesn’t allow the Whos to live safely in the
camouf laged anonymity afforded by three million identical clovers. Instead he
undertakes a Herculean effort to find and retrieve his clover, his speck, his people.
Why? Because, of course, the speck belongs to Horton. It is his speck and he wants it
back, no matter the consequences. Horton expresses the common refrain of property
owners young and old, a sentiment that would be universally understood by even the
31.

These vaguely sinister monkeys appear to be named after President Herbert Hoover’s Wickersham
Commission, which was established in 1929 to investigate instances of “lawlessness in law enforcement,”
including illegal arrests, bribery, entrapment, witness coercion, abusive interrogations, evidence
fabrication, wiretapping, and police brutality. See West, supra note 6, at 353–54. Seuss’s use of the name
is ironic, as in Horton it is the Wickersham Brothers who are the instruments of the kangaroo’s corrupt
state, rather than its prosecutors. It is also interesting to note that the Wickersham Commission
recommended the continuation of Prohibition in the United States, a law that devastated young Theodor
Geisel’s immigrant family, which operated a brewery in Springfield, Massachusetts. See id.; see also
Pease, supra note 3, at 16.

32.

As Professor Radin explains, the loss of a possession (such as a wedding ring) that is bound up with the
owner’s sense of personhood is typically viewed as non-compensable. Radin, supra note 17, at 159.

33.

Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 1 (emphasis added).

34. Id. (emphasis added).
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smallest reader of Horton: it’s mine, give it back! And, as we know, Horton does find
his speck, and the Whos, once again.
The Condemnation of Who-ville

But then the trouble really begins, as Horton and the Whos come face to face
with the authority of the state, represented by the sour kangaroo. Shortly after
Horton’s recovery of his speck from the hundred-mile clover patch, the kangaroo
again dispatches the Wickershams. They forcibly restrain Horton, seize the speck,
and prepare to boil it in Beezle-Nut oil. As such, the kangaroo wields the traditional
“police” power of the state to divest its citizens of their property and to condemn that
property to destruction to preserve public health, safety, and welfare.
The taking of property for a public purpose, or eminent domain, is among the oldest
prerogatives of the state and is said to have its origins in Roman law.35 The power of
eminent domain has been recognized under U.S. law since the earliest days, and is
exemplified by the Supreme Court’s 1879 decision in Bowditch v. Boston, affirming the
city’s unqualified right to dynamite a private citizen’s warehouse, destroying it and its
contents, in order to stop the spread of fire.36 Since Bowditch, the eminent domain power
of the state has been expanded to permit the condemnation of private property for public
purposes, broadly defined. These purposes encompass the elimination of urban blight,37
the facilitation of economic development,38 the de-concentration of land ownership,39
and the containment of harmful agricultural pathogens.40
In the kangaroo’s jungle state, the public interest at stake is preservation of the
peace. As she explains,
For almost two days you’ve run wild and insisted
On chatting with persons who’ve never existed.
Such carryings-on in our peaceable jungle!

We’ve had quite enough of your bellowing bungle!41
35.

See generally Jesse Dukeminier et al., Property 1061–62 (7th ed. 2010) (discussing the origins of the
state’s eminent domain power).

36. 101 U.S. 16 (1879) (holding that no compensation was due to the plaintiff on account of the city’s

destruction of his warehouse when effected to address a fire emergency).

37.

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (justifying the demolition of a non-blighted block in an otherwise
run-down area of Washington, D.C. on the theory that “[i]f [Congress] decides that the Nation’s Capital
shall be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way”).

38. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (authorizing the condemnation of fifteen private

residences under a city redevelopment plan that would have transferred the condemned property to Pfizer).

39.

Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (upholding the constitutionality of the Hawaii
Land Reform Act of 1967, which allowed renters to acquire fee simple ownership of their rental property
in order to break up the “oligopsonistic” character of Hawaiian land ownership).

40. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding a Virginia statute requiring the destruction, without

compensation, of cedar trees infected by a plant disease to prevent its communication to Virginia’s
commercially valuable apple trees).

41.

Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 1.
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In the kangaroo’s view, Horton suffers from a delusion that sentient beings exist on
a speck of dust. This eccentric behavior has, not surprisingly, created a stir within the
jungle community, and she seeks to restore order by eliminating the source of Horton’s
delusion. Thus, while the kangaroo is often depicted as a villain eager to inflict grievous
harm on Who-ville, in actuality she acts with two legitimate governmental purposes:
(1) curing a diagnosed mental delusion in one of its citizens (Horton) and (2) restoring
order to the community.42 While Who-ville will be annihilated if her plan is carried
out, she is, at the time, unaware that Who-ville actually exists (and, truth be told,
acting pretty rationally in her disbelief of Horton’s claim).
So the speck is seized and condemned by the state, this time slated for permanent
destruction. Who-ville may thus join Detroit’s Poletown,43 Washington, D.C.’s “Area
B,”44 the block containing Suzy Kelo’s house in New London, Connecticut,45 and a
long list of other neighborhoods that have fallen to state-sanctioned wrecking balls
in the name of urban renewal, economic development, and other public purposes.46
Recovery and Protection(ism)

But, of course, Horton does not end tragically. The Whos manage to overcome
their collective action problem47 and make enough noise to be heard by the kangaroo
and her minions, who then willingly abandon their plan of destruction. They do so
because they receive faint but audible confirmation of the Whos’ existence, and thus
42.

At this point in the narrative Dr. Seuss does appear to depict the kangaroo as a villain, both in her visual
rendition and in the narrative. See id.

43.

See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) (condemning a
neighborhood to make room for a General Motors plant).

44. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman

v. Parker, 42 Urb. Law. 423 (2010).

45.

See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).

46. Of course, under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, most takings of private property must

be compensated. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes Taking of Property Requiring
Compensation Under Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution—Supreme Court
Cases, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 231 (2014).

47.

The classic collective action problem was described by economist and social scientist Mancur Olson in
1965:
If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they
will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to
force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of
the common or group interest, is offered to members of the group individually on the
condition that they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of the
group objectives. . . . These points hold true even when there is unanimous agreement
in a group about the common good and the methods of achieving it.

Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 2
(2d ed. 1971). In effect, Olson’s insight is that individuals will not act to achieve a common goal unless
they have individual incentives to do so, the achievement of the common good being insufficient to motivate
their action. This problem confronts the Mayor of Who-ville as he attempts to persuade young Jo-Jo to
add his voice to the accumulated clamor and commotion generated by the rest of the citizens of Who-ville.
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Horton’s sanity. It is no longer necessary to eliminate Horton’s speck to preserve the
peace.
But Horton’s denouement surprises the reader yet again. At this point, with the
Whos recognized as real and not mere figments of Horton’s imagination, the
kangaroo might simply have returned the speck to Horton, or better yet released it
back into the wild. But instead, the kangaroo issues a perplexing edict:
And, from now on, you know what I’m planning to do?...
From now on, I’m going to protect them with you!48

She declares that she will “protect” the speck and its inhabitants, dedicating the
authority of the state to the security of the small and helpless Whos. It is not enough
to leave the Whos alone, to let them lead an autonomous and unmolested existence
in Who-ville. No. Presumably because of their small size and vulnerable nature, the
Whos warrant the continued protection and oversight of the state. They are thus
reduced to the status of wards, rather than fully autonomous citizens.
This move, too, has historical antecedents. One sees it most tellingly in the
American treatment of native peoples, with the policy first announced by Chief
Justice John Marshall in the landmark 1823 case Johnson v. M’Intosh.49 In Johnson,
Marshall declines to recognize native title in the lands of North America, favoring
instead the title claimed by European explorers three centuries earlier on behalf of
England, Spain, and other Christian powers. He justifies this apparent seizure of
property in part on the basis of the “character and habits” of the native inhabitants,
whom he calls “fierce savages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was
drawn chiefly from the forest.”50 People such as this, he reasons, have no business
owning or disposing of valuable territory that could be put to more productive use by
settlers of European descent.
Once divesting them of their title to the land, Marshall makes another notable
move regarding the Native Americans. Rather than treating them as ordinary
citizens of the young republic, he relegates them to a diminished status, like wards of
the state. “[T]he Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants, to be
protected, indeed, while in peace, in the possession of their lands, but to be deemed
incapable of transferring the absolute title to others.”51 This view of the Native
Americans as incompetent and in need of protection gave rise to the so-called “trust
doctrine” in federal Indian law, under which tribal lands are held by the state in trust
for the native occupants.52 As confirmed by the Court more than sixty years after
Johnson, “[t]hese Indian tribes are wards of the nation. . . . From their very weakness
48. Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
49. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
50. Id. at 589–90.
51.

Id. at 591 (emphasis added).

52.

See Blake A. Watson, Buying America from the Indians: Johnson v. McIntosh and the
History of Native Land Rights 334–36 (2012).
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and helplessness . . . there arises the duty of protection.”53 And, as a necessary
corollary to the state’s obligation to protect, comes the ward’s duty to obey, as a child
or other incompetent must comply with the decisions of his or her guardians. To this
end, the Court observes in 1917 that with respect to the Native Americans, the
“wish of the ward [must] yield to the will of the guardian.”54
It has been noted by innumerable commentators that the U.S. government’s
treatment of the country’s native inhabitants was shameful, notwithstanding efforts
to couch its actions in the rhetoric of legal process. Few have observed this trend
with greater alacrity than the young French nobleman Alexis de Tocqueville, who
visited the United States from 1831 to 1832 and published his observations in the
seminal work Democracy in America. Just a few years after Marshall’s opinion in
Johnson, de Tocqueville writes:
The Spaniards were unable to exterminate the Indian race by those
unparalleled atrocities which brand them with indelible shame, nor did they
even succeed in wholly depriving it of its rights; but the Americans of the
United States have accomplished this twofold purpose with singular felicity;
tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood, and without
violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of the world. It is
impossible to destroy men with more respect for the laws of humanity.55

So, despite the seemingly happy ending of Horton, one must consider the
implications for Who-ville of the state’s “protective” stance. As the U.S. government’s
treatment of its native peoples suggests, dominant societies have not always done well
when extending their protection to servient ones. The rhetoric of “protection” has, in
fact, been used throughout history to justify a wide range of oppressive governmental
regimes. And while there is no indication that the kangaroo’s jungle regime will treat
Who-ville with anything other than kindness,56 the same regime clearly demonstrated
its willingness to resort to brutal strong-arm tactics only a few pages earlier. Thus, the
Whos might wish to carefully consider their newfound protectors.
Deconstructing Horton

There is an old adage that observes, “If all you have is a hammer, everything
looks like a nail.”57 I teach property law, and I readily admit to seeing (imagining?)
53.

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886).

54. United States v. Rowell, 23 U.S. 464, 468 (1917), quoted in Watson, supra note 52, at 336.
55.

1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 353 (Henry Reeve trans., 3d Am. ed. 1898).

56. It is a tribute to Seuss’s artistry that his graphical depictions of the kangaroo, monkeys, and other jungle

denizens is so radically transformed over the course of a few pages: from depraved and sinister glee as
they prepare the pot of boiling oil, to childlike wonderment as they hear the cry of the Whos, to regal
magnanimity as the kangaroo and her joey extend a protective umbrella over Horton’s speck of dust. See
Horton Hears a Who!, supra note 1.

57.

This adage has been called “Baruch’s Observation,” after Bernard Baruch, who may or may not have
originated it. Arthur Bloch, The Complete Murphy’s Law: A Definitive Collection (1991).
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traces of property law in places where others might not.58 My goal in this essay is not
to argue that the property-based concepts described above are explicit messages
intended by the author to be read into Horton. Nor am I suggesting that Theodor
Geisel intended Horton to be a pro-property, pro-government, or, Heaven forbid, a
pro-slavery tract. Of course not. One must not lose sight of the fact that Horton is a
parable of equality and otherness, and its longstanding reputation as such is well
deserved.59 What I do contend, however, is that Horton offers valuable insights into
mid-twentieth-century attitudes about ownership, autonomy, and the state; attitudes
that stem, in large part, from prevailing legal rules governing property.
Horton the elephant does not think of the Whos as his own because he is greedy,
because he wishes to exert his will over them, or because he has delusions of grandeur.
Those who read Horton as being motivated by altruism, friendship, and even love
are not without solid grounding in the text. However, the notions of ownership
outlined in this essay are also present, albeit below the surface. They are present, I
believe, because notions of private property and the value of ownership are deeply
ingrained in the social fabric of the United States. They have long been viewed as an
integral part of the American legal framework,60 and as fundamental characteristics
of an American society that was vastly superior, morally and economically, to the
collectivist ideology of Bolshevik Russia and Maoist China.61 Theodor Geisel, the
son of German immigrants and business owners, undoubtedly shared this American
respect for private property, and it is not surprising that this sentiment found its way
into works such as Horton.62 And while the salvage claim made in the La Amistad
case would be unthinkable today, how far removed are Horton’s assumptions
regarding the Whos from those of the owners of company towns that flourished in
mid-twentieth-century America?
Likewise, the idea of a protective, paternalistic state could not have been far from
the minds of many Americans, least of all Geisel’s, in the decade after World War II.
Post-war America was steeped in patriotism, and the image of the (American) state
as a protector of liberty and freedom was prevalent throughout the nation. It should
58. Cf. Eric R. Claeys, On Cowbells in Rock Anthems (and Property in IP): A Review of Justifying Intellectual

Property, 49 San Diego L. Rev. 1033, 1033–34 (2012) (“When he heard (Don’t Fear) The Reaper,
Bruce Dickinson had to have more cowbell; when I read IP scholarship, I gotta have more property.”).

59.

See supra note 6.

60. See, e.g., Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. &

Econ. 467 (1976) (describing the predominance of property-based concepts on the thinking of Thomas
Jefferson); William H. Taft, The Right of Private Property, 3 Mich. L.J. 215, 215 (1894) (“As far back as
we can go in the history of the common law of England, the right of property of the freeman was
theoretically inviolate.”).

61.

See, e.g., Richard Pipes, Human Nature and the Fall of Communism, 49 Am. Acad. Arts & Sci. Bull.
38, 38 (1996) (arguing that the abolition of private property was a primary cause of the decline of the
Soviet Union); Taft, supra note 60, at 218 (characterizing laws guaranteeing private property as
buttresses against the “attacks of anarchy, socialism and communism”).

62. Geisel’s family owned a prosperous brewing company in Springfield, Illinois during most of his

childhood. The family’s business was ruined by the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment and the
introduction of Prohibition in 1919, when Geisel was fifteen. Pease, supra note 3, at 16.
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not be forgotten that Geisel conceived Horton during a 1950 trip to Japan, a devastated
country that was still under occupation by U.S. and other Allied forces.63 Geisel
acknowledged the influence of his observations in Japan on themes appearing in
Horton, notably the book’s validation of individuality and self-worth (attributes that
he found lacking among the post-war Japanese).64 It would not be surprising,
therefore, if other, less superficial manifestations of Geisel’s Japanese visit found
their way into Horton. For example, the need (or obligation) for powerful states to
protect lesser, subjugated states, is sensitively depicted by the joey’s extension of a
small umbrella to shield Who-ville from the elements.65
The image of the state as a benevolent protector of its wards still bore currency in
the era of Horton, though that rosy image would soon disappear amidst the civil
unrest of the 1960s and the environmental crises of the 1970s. Geisel’s later works,
most notably The Sneetches (1961),66 do not present a favorable impression of the state
or societal governance mechanisms. These are instead represented as corrupt and
ineffective in combating social ills such as inequality and discrimination. Thus, in
Yertle the Turtle (1958), Seuss depicts an autocratic turtle king whose power rests,
literally, on the backs of his subjects.67 Finally, in The Lorax (1971), Seuss paints a
dark picture of a society dominated by corporate greed and a rapacious thirst for
resources.68 In the depressing world of the Lorax, there is little sense that property
ownership represents a social good, or that any but soulless despoilers seek to exercise
their rights over the land and its hapless inhabitants.
But Horton, written in the less pessimistic post-war years, does not yet condemn
capitalism and private ownership, and the signs of Geisel’s early favorable disposition
toward property ownership, property rules, and state protection emerge in the
narrative. Horton thus offers a view, unsettling and surprising at times, but perhaps
understandable, of how thoroughly property-based sensibilities permeated the
thinking of mid-twentieth-century America.

63. See id. at 92–93.
64. Id. at 93.
65.

But see Timothy E. Cook, Another Perspective on Political Authority in Children’s Literature: The Fallible
Leader in L. Frank Baum and Dr. Seuss, 36 W. Pol. Q. 326, 331–32 (1983) (reading Horton as portraying
a general American “ethic of individual coping, self-reliance and responsibility for one’s own destiny[,]”
particularly as exemplified by the salvation of Who-ville through the efforts of “the Smallest of All”).

66. The Sneetches, supra note 8.
67.

Dr. Seuss, Yertle the Turtle, in Yertle the Turtle and Other Stories (1958). King Yertle is
commonly viewed as an allegory of Hitler’s autocratic state. See Pease, supra note 3, at 118.

68. Dr. Seuss, The Lorax (1971).
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